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This paper will examine the evolving role of the judiciary from the early adversarial 
trial up until the advent of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2013 [hereafter, CPR]. The 
paper will chart the role played in early criminal proceedings, starting with the 
lawyer-free ‘altercation’ trial of the sixteenth century. Here, the judiciary assumed an 
early form of case management powers; they actively manage cases and acted as 
counsel for the defendant. The prohibition on defence counsel was lifted in the 
eighteenth century, this was the genesis of adversarial trial. The role of active judicial 
participation rapidly diminished and an era of judicial passivity commenced. The 
paper will investigate whether a cultural shift has occurred in the contemporary 
criminal trial. At the heart of this pendulum swing is a question: is the judiciary 
reverting to its pre-adversarial approach by departing from its position of passivity to 
become a more active participant in the arena of the criminal trial? The paper will 
discuss the potential ramifications this culture shift has for the future of the 
adversarial criminal justice process of England and Wales. 
 
1. The Lawyer Free ‘Accused Speak’ Trial to the Adversarial 
Trial  
 
The lawyer-free trial was an altercation between citizen accusers and the accused. 
Throughout the trial process the roles of the accused as both defendant and witness 
were inextricably linked.
1
 Following the conclusion of the altercation the judge left 
the jury to decide upon the guilt or innocence of the accused; often with little judicial 
intervention. Langbein suggests that there is very little written about the early 
altercation trial and Sir Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum is the earliest 
account of the trials of the time. According to Smith, at the conclusion of the 
altercation, the judge merely told the jury ‘ye have heard what these men say against 
the prisoner, you have also heard what the prisoner can say for himself.’2 In the 
altercation trial the judge acted as both the examiner and cross-examiner; the duty of 
the judge was to present the evidence to the defendant and he would have the 
opportunity to counter to maintain his innocence. 
3
 No form of pre-trial disclosure 
existed and the accused would hear the evidence against him for the first time at trial. 
This was a pivotal part of the proceedings as it was thought the unrehearsed responses 
would give the best indication of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
4
 Occasionally, 
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the judge would intervene to ensure what was being said remained relevant to 
proceedings. During the trial, the accused was seen to be an ‘informational resource’ 
to the court. The oral discussion by the accused of the events was the key component 
to the trials rapid speed; it was believed that the most efficient way to adduce 
evidence is to have the accused speak about the alleged offence(s).
5
 The length of 
altercation trials, including jury deliberations, was between fifteen and twenty 
minutes,
6
 so justice was both rapid and swift.  
 
Very little is known about the trial process during this period outside of the Smith’s 
account. However, a great deal more is written about treason trials. Langbein suggests 
these accounts were collected retrospectively and the collection was known as the 
State Trials.
7
 These trials differed from the altercation trial, as prosecution counsel 
were permitted in the courtroom. In the treason trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, 
8
 
the defendant responded to questions from both the prosecution and the bench. 
Furthermore, the trials gave rise to a very early form of judicial case management. It 
would be the responsibility of the judge to direct proceedings; including the 
admission and presentation of evidence and the judge would comment on witness 
testimony as it was being heard in court.
9
 The prohibition on defence counsel applied 
to matters of fact rather than law. The accused was permitted to engage counsel to 
make submissions of law.
10
 However, the vast majority of defendants raised no issues 
of law, save for entering a plea of not guilty. Beattie
11
 illustrates that from 1740 until 
1780 cases with prosecution counsel did not exceed eight per cent per annum. 
Whereas defence representation was seen in even fewer instances and did not exceed 
six per cent.
12
 As so few defendants engaged counsel, this left the judiciary to assume 
the mantle of counsel and the task was discharged in the most basic of fashion. This 
did not mean the court assisted in the formulation of a defence or act as advocates; 
they merely observed their responsibility to ensure the defendant was protected from 
illegal procedure or faulty indictments.
13
 
 
It was the Treason Act 1696 that first permitted defendants to be represented at trial. 
However, the lifting of the prohibition only applied in treason trials and defence 
counsel were still not permitted to represent defendants in ordinary cases of felony.
14
 
There were four overarching reasons that ensured treason trials were demarcated as a 
procedural world of their own and permitted defence counsel:
15
 
 
I. Prosecutorial Imbalance: There was an imbalance between the prosecuting 
lawyer and the unrepresented accused. This notion of imbalance stemmed 
from potential prosecutorial misconduct, examples of this misconduct 
includes reliance on perjured testimony and the inequality of the procedure 
to convict the defendant. The prosecution were permitted to hire as 
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lawyers as required; whereas the defendant was left unrepresented. In an 
ordinary felony case, the victim or kin of the victim acted as the prosecutor 
and he was not the beneficiary of vast state resources funding the search 
for witnesses who supports the prosecution’s story. 
 
II. Judicial Bias: As indicated by the Stuart treason trials, the subservience of 
the court to the King was a problem perceived to be specific to treason 
trials. Most of these trials took place in London under the watchful gaze of 
the Crown and the judges were hand picked for the trials. The King had an 
acute interest in the outcome of a treason trial; he had no direct interest in 
whether a defendant was found guilty of stealing sheep and therefore these 
lesser offences did not require assistance from defence counsel.
16
 
 
III. The Complexity: Ordinary crimes were thought to involve more reliable 
proofs; Burglary, stealing sheep or murder are  examples of crimes that 
would potentially leave witnesses or other evidence whereas the evidence 
in treason trials may be evidence of a person overhearing a plot to kill the 
King. The case of Popish Plot
17
 underlined the inherent dangers of false 
testimony being admitted and therefore a greater propensity of evidential 
probing by counsel was required. It would be impossible to think an 
unrepresented defendant, who has no knowledge of the charge would be 
able to comprehend and probe the evidence the prosecution have 
advanced.  
 
IV. Evening Up: By permitting the defendant to be represented by defence 
counsel the Treason Act was evened the playing field because the Crown 
was represented by the prosecution.  
 
However, there was a fundamental reason for lifting of the prohibition but limiting its 
application to purely treason trials. This was an attempt by the judiciary to preserve 
the ‘Accused Speaks’ trial. Trials for treason were relatively rare there was no threat 
the permitting the defence lawyer into the court would diminish the traditional 
‘accused speaks’ trial. 18  As such the defendant would not lose his voice in the 
courtroom and his status as an informational resource of the court would be 
preserved. However, the impact of permitting defence counsel in the court room had 
an impact on the role of the trial judge.  Ultimately, the evolving prominence of the 
defence lawyer diluted the role of the judiciary; it diminished the role that judges 
played in proceedings. The changing trial process prompted criticism from James 
Fitzjames Stephen who thought the law manifestly unfair as certain offences were 
allowed defence representation but others were not afforded such a right, solely due to 
the crime the accused committed. He said ‘[I]t was a matter of direct personal interest 
to many members of parliament that trials for political offences should not be grossly 
unfair but they were indifferent as to the fate [of those] accused of sheep-stealing, 
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burglary and murder.’19 By 1730 Stephen’s criticism had been alleviated and defence 
representation was now permitted in ordinary felony trials. Prosecution lawyers had 
become increasingly involved in such cases and the judges of 1730s allowed 
defendants the assistance of counsel to probe evidence advance by prosecution 
lawyers.
20
 With the 1730s ushering in the era of the early adversarial trial, the role of 
the judiciary had been drastically altered. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, both the admission and presentation of the evidence was the responsibility 
of the judge.
21
 Prior to the introduction of the adversarial trial the judiciary were 
highly proactive and would take witnesses through their testimony, often line-by-line, 
acting as both the prosecutor and cross-examiner.
22
 However, with the proficiency of 
the lawyers at adducing evidence, the judiciary began to adopt an increasingly passive 
role in proceedings. Charles Cottu remarked that the early adversarial English trial 
judge ‘remains almost a stranger to what is going on’23 during the process of cross-
examination. Throughout the period of altercation trials, the judiciary led fact-finding 
because nobody else could.
24
 In the more lawyer-dominated proceedings the judiciary 
compared poorly when compared to the skills of the lawyers. The adversarial setting 
allowed counsel to be better prepared to adduce evidence as they had the vast benefit 
of pre-trial preparation. As such, this left the judge at a stark disadvantage and he 
slipped quietly into the background. The once prominent participant had been 
relegated to the role of passive observer in the new era of the adversarial criminal 
trial.   
 
2. The Lawyer Dominated Trial 
 
With the advent of the adversarial criminal trial, the defence lawyer assumed a more 
dominant role in proceedings. Initially, defendants were only permitted to instruct 
counsel in trials of treason, and the defendant was not afforded a full defence; lawyers 
were merely permitted to examine and cross-examine witnesses but were unable to 
address the jury. Over the course of the mid eighteenth century and the early 
nineteenth century, this stance would change. In 1836, the Second Report of the 
Criminal Law Commissioners
25
 was published. This report fully supported a full right 
to defence counsel. The commissioners ridiculed the traditional stance that the truth of 
the offence would manifest from the prisoner’s unprepared testimony as both ‘strange 
and unreasonable.’26 The Prisoner’s Counsel Act27 brought about an immediate and 
far-reaching transformation of criminal procedure. The Act replaced ‘the rough and 
ready procedure of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries into the scrupulous 
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adversarial trial of today.’28 The Act permitted all persons who were tried for a felony 
to be granted permission to a full defence by counsel learned in the law or by an 
Attorney in courts where an Attorney practices as counsel.
29
 The Act also permitted a 
person bailed or committed to prison to be entitled, on demand, to copies of the 
examination of witnesses on who’s deposition they have been held, for the sum of 
three and a half pence for each folio of ninety words.
30
  
 
The introduction of defence counsel to the criminal trial disentangled two activities 
that were previously the sole responsibility of the unrepresented defendant; it was the 
duty of the defence lawyer to probe whether the prosecution had a tenable case 
against the defendant.  If so, the lawyer would offer evidence of a defensive nature to 
rebut the prosecution’s allegations. The defence lawyer was able to insist on asking 
on the judge if the prosecution have discharged their burden of adducing sufficient 
evidence to support a verdict in their favour. The defence lawyer would typically 
move for a verdict of an acquittal at the conclusion of the prosecution’s evidence. If a 
judge overruled this, the defence would then present its evidence.
31
 The inclusion of 
the defence lawyer altered the very fabric of the trial; he broke up the dual roles of 
speaking and defending that had previously been the responsibility of the accused. He 
assumed the role of defender; he insisted on prosecutorial burdens of proof and 
largely shut down the role of the accused.
32
 Prior to the involvement of the defence 
lawyer, the trial was the forum in which the accused could reply to the charge and 
evidence against him. The evolution of the adversarial trial changed this concept; the 
new ‘lawyer-dominated’ trials were no longer the place the accused merely aired his 
response to the charge, but became the forum in which the accused’s defence counsel 
tested the prosecution’s case.33 With the lawyer now a fully-fledged participant in 
proceedings the previous functions of the judiciary were stripped from him. Gone 
were his responsibilities of organising and presenting the evidence as well as 
examining and cross-examining witnesses. Effectively, the judiciary was relegated to 
the role of a passive observer and it is easy to see how Cottu made two central 
observations to the English criminal trial. Firstly, the judge is ‘almost a stranger to 
what is going on’ and secondly, ‘[the accused] does so little in his own defence that 
his hat stuck on a pole might, without inconvenience, be his substitute at trial.’34 It 
was clear that the lawyers are now dominating proceedings.
35
 The era of the judicial 
led accused speaks trial was ended and an era of judicial passivity was commenced.  
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2.1 The Mid Twentieth Century 
 
The notion of judicial passivity continued into the middle of the twentieth century. In 
1944, Lord Greene MR stated if a judge conducted cross-examination, he ‘descends 
into the arena and is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of conflict’.36 By 
reverting to his former role as an engaged participant, it was thought that the judge 
would lose his position as an observer as a result of his clouded vision ‘he 
unconsciously deprives himself of the advantage of calm and dispassionate 
observation’. 37  The trial judge should refrain from entering the arena of the 
adversarial battle, save for clearing up a point. Lord Greene was not alone in stressing 
the importance of the judiciary to remaining passive and unengaged throughout the 
trial proceedings. In 1957, Lord Justice Denning gave the quintessential description of 
the modern day adversarial judge. The Court of Appeal case Jones v National Coal 
Board
38
 centered on the fact the judge intervened too frequently during cross-
examination. It was held that the judge should intervene as infrequently as possible as 
the heart of cross-examination lies in the unbroken sequence of question and 
answer.
39
 Excessive judicial interruption weakens the effectiveness of cross-
examination and in this instance the defence were unduly hampered by the 
interventions. The judge frequently initiated discussions with counsel and often 
interrupted witnesses during their answers to a question; he effectively had taken the 
task of examination out of the hands of the advocate. This behavior was deemed to 
fall outside the realm of their role. Denning LJ said the role of the judge is to 
‘hearken’ to the evidence, he can ask questions to clear up a point and keep the 
advocates in good order and ensure they follow procedure and avoid repetition. If he 
goes beyond these tasks he ‘drops the mantle of a judge and assumes the role of an 
advocate; the change does not become him well.
40
 Furthermore, Denning reiterated 
the position of the Lord Chancellor stating that ‘patience and gravity of hearing is an 
essential part of justice; and an over speaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal’.41  
 
In Clewer
42
 the defendant appealed on the basis of undue interruption by the judge. 
The judge was of the opinion that the defence advanced was improbable. Goodard 
LJC stated that if ‘counsel was interrupted … his task becomes impossible’.43 The 
judge went as far as suggesting to the jury that the defence is raising ‘false issues.’44 
The court quashed the conviction. The Court of Appeal took a very dim view of the 
illegitimate conduct from the judiciary of the judge. In Barnes
45
 the judge informed 
the defence that he takes ‘a serious view of hopeless cases … contested at public 
expense’. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction because of the ‘wholly 
improper’ conduct of the judge in exerting pressure to enter a guilty plea.46  
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If the judiciary resumes the role of an active participant in proceedings he clearly runs 
the risk of jeopordising the right to a fair trial of the accused. In the Irish case of 
Phelim McGuinness
47
 the accused was granted leave to appeal, as the interventions of 
the trial judge rendered the trial unsatisfactory and the verdict potentially unsafe. The 
Appeal Court held that the active participation by a judge in examination-in-chief is 
undesirable as it may purport to the accused that the judiciary are lacking 
impartiality.
48
 During the examination of a defence witness the judge interjected with 
twenty consecutive questions. As a result, the Appeal Court ordered a retrial.  
 
The aforementioned case examples illustrate the boundaries the judiciary faced in the 
twentieth century. No longer is the judge an active participant who is requested of 
actively engaging with the witnesses and evidence. However, it is clear that he should 
not be viewed as the stranger advanced by Cottu in the formative years of the 
adversarial trial. Both Greene MR and Denning LJ state the role of the judge is more 
than merely a cricket umpire asking ‘how’s that? His object, above all is to find the 
truth’.49  It is clear that the judge is more than a mere umpire in proceedings but issues 
exist in delineating the boundaries. Silverman suggests the judge can be a pilot who 
guides the trial along orderly lines but is confined within the rules of evidence and 
procedure. This steering role means that he can be considered less than a participant, 
as he refrains from entering the fray of combat but is more than a sporting umpire.
50
 
 
3. The Twenty-First Century: A ‘Sea Change’ and a Shifting 
Pendulum 
 
With the advent of the adversarial criminal trial the role of the judge was demoted 
from active participant to that of a pilot who was responsible for guiding the trial to 
completion. This remained the quintessential approach until the early part of the new 
millennium where tension arose between the judiciary’s approach to case 
management and judicial demeanor. Lord Justice Auld’s Review of the Criminal 
Courts of England and Wales
51
 (hereafter, the Auld Review) provided the catalyst for 
a change in judicial demeanor. Auld LJ suggested that the ‘criminal trial is not a game 
under which a guilty to defendant should be provided with a sporting chance. It is a 
search for the truth …’52 In the wake of the Auld Review the judiciary began to 
embrace their changing role. In Chabaan
53
 the judge refused the application on the 
basis that he expected the case to be dealt with expeditiously and it should not 
conclude beyond a pre-defined date. The defendant was convicted and he appealed on 
the basis, inter alia, that the judge should not have refused the expert application. The 
appeal was dismissed and Judge LJ stated that ‘a judge has always been responsible 
for managing the trial … that is one of his most important functions’.54 Judge LJ 
highlighted the importance of dealing with cases expeditiously. He said that ‘time is 
not unlimited … the entitlement of a fair trial is not inconsistent with proper judicial 
control over the use of time … every trial that takes longer than necessary is wasteful 
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of limited resources.’ 55  The importance of dealing with cases efficiently and 
effectively is clear. Furthermore adjournments to instruct experts to make speculative 
investigations will no longer be tolerated. Judge LJ took the opportunity to reinforce 
the notion that the era of active case management had dawned. In Jisl
56
 Judge LJ 
reiterated this point and explicitly outlined that the starting point of a criminal case is 
simple: 
 
‘Justice must be done. The defendant is entitled to a fair trial: and, which is 
sometimes overlooked, the prosecution is equally entitled to a reasonable 
opportunity to present the evidence against the defendant. It is not however a 
concomitant of the entitlement to a fair trial that either or both sides are further 
entitled to take as much time as they like, or for that matter, as long as counsel 
and solicitors or the defendants themselves think appropriate. Resources are 
limited ... [I]t follows that the sensible use of time requires judicial 
management and control’.57 
 
With the goal to eroding the ‘sporting chance’ Auld LJ suggested creating a single 
corpus of rules for a unified criminal court.
58
 The recommendations led to the creation 
of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005.
59
  The Rules are underpinned by an Overriding 
Objective to deal with cases justly,
60
 dealing with a case justly includes the Acquitting 
the innocent and convicting the guilty,
61
 dealing with both sides fairly,
62
 recognizing 
the ECHR rights of the defendant,
63
 respecting the interests of witness, jurors and 
victims,
64
 dealing with cases in an efficient and expeditious manner,
65
 ensuring that 
the court has appropriate information when considering bail and sentencing
66
 and 
dealing with case that takes into account the gravity of the offence, its complexity, the 
severity of the consequences for the defendant and the needs of other cases.
67
At face 
value, the overriding objective appears to employ a common sense approach to 
criminal trials that previously might be viewed as an inefficient and ineffective 
system benefits nobody. However, by unpicking the individual sections of the 
objective it is clear a paradigm shift in judicial culture underpins the rules and the 
emphasis of not wasting resources. It is apparent that the semi-passive, piloting 
approach to the role of a judge in criminal cases is to be replaced by that of a more 
active, hands on, case-manager. Lord Justice Thomas suggested the advent of the 
CPR effected a ‘sea change’68 in how criminal cases should conducted and Part III of 
the rules outlines explicitly exactly what constitutes good case management.  
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3.1 Active Case Management 
 
In order to satisfy the overriding objective, a duty is placed on the court to actively 
manage the case and rule 3.2(1) outlines eight component parts to active case 
management.
69
 A key driver behind the active case management provision is saving 
resources. Time is a resource that should not be wasted. In D and Others
70
 it was held 
that to deal with a case ‘justly’ requires efficiency and expedition.71 The trial lasted 
for 235 days but court only sat for 132 of those days. Moses LJ went on to say the 
main cause of delay lay in the failure of the Judge to ensure that a sufficient number 
of hours were sat  in order to read and hear the evidence. Despite this failure, counsel 
did not escape criticism. The court was dismayed by the fact counsel declined to tell 
the Judge how long cross-examination of certain witnesses would take.
72
 To satisfy 
the implicit time-saving goals, the judiciary is permitted to curtail oral argument and 
have counsel produce their submissions in writing.
73
 
 
 
As well as refusal applications, active case management allows the judiciary to curtail 
any cross-examination that is deemed unnecessary or repetitious. In Butt
74
 defence 
counsel spent a great deal of time asking questions to establish background 
information. Counsel then went on to conduct a detailed repetitious cross-examination 
as to the events of the material time and the allegation of rape. The judge said counsel 
was concentrating on unimportant issues and cross-examination was to be finished in 
ten minutes. The defendant was convicted and appealed on the basis the judge 
prevented his counsel from cross-examining the complainant adequately and this 
resulted in an unfair trial. The appeal was dismissed and the Court stated that the 
cross-examination wasted time and was repetitious. Counsel spent too much time 
reaching the ‘real issue’ of whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse. 
Dyson LJ stated the ‘management of a trial involves the exercise of judgment and 
discretion and the court will not interfere with a decision made when the judge is 
exercising this function.
75
  
 
3.2 Over Zealous Case Management: The overactive judiciary  
 
There are limits to the case management powers possessed by the judiciary and at 
times they are guilty of overstepping the boundary of acceptable conduct.  In 
Cordingley
76
 the trial judge was deemed to act in an oppressive manner toward the 
defendant. In the interests of efficiency the judge in the first instance disagreed with 
counsel’s assertion that the estimated length of the trial should be three days. The 
judge intimated this should be reduced. Bail was also withdrawn, despite the 
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defendant being released on bail for the previous eight months. The Court of Appeal 
endorse robust case management and ensuring the time of the court is used sensibly, 
however in this instance the conduct of the trial judge betrays an element of rudeness 
on which he should have been ashamed.
77
 The safety of a conviction does not merely 
depend upon the strength of evidence that the jury hears but also the observance of 
due process. It was clear to the Court of Appeal that the effect of the judge’s conduct 
was to inhibit the defendant in the course of his defence. To the court this point was 
inescapable and would have severe consequences for the credibility of the defendant 
before a jury.
78
 
 
Robust case management is a pivotal part of the modern day criminal trial. However, 
discourteous bad manners will not be tolerated by the courts. Furthermore, excessive 
judicial intervention is also not permitted. In Copsey
79
the judge asked 60 questions in 
the first defendant’s evidence-in-chief and 50 during cross-examination. The co-
accused was asked 57 throughout his evidence-in-chief and 36 during cross-
examination. Many of the questions took the form of cross-examination and ended 
with the question ‘did you?’ The judge made disparaging and potentially prejudicial 
remarks about the defence evidence; he referred to part the evidence as ‘bizarre’ and 
was dismissive of defence witnesses. Both defendants were convicted and appealed 
on the basis that inter alia there was excessive judicial intervention that would lead 
the jury to perceive that the judge did not believe their case. The nature of frequency 
of the questioning concerned the Court of Appeal, especially his contention that an 
important part of the defence case was labelled ‘bizarre’. Ultimately, the conduct of 
the judge rendered the trial unfair and ultimately, the conviction unsafe.
80
  
 
Interestingly, not all ‘excessive’ interventions render the trial unfair. In Zarezadeh81 
the trial judge made a number of interventions during his cross-examination for the 
prosecution. The judge effectively appeared to the jury as a ‘second prosecutor’ and 
the impression potentially given to the jury is one that the judge does not accept what 
the defendant was saying.
82
 However, despite this impression being given to the jury, 
the Court of Appeal held this did not infringe the Appellant’s right to a fair trial. The 
court decided the judge did not go beyond the point of elucidating exactly what 
Appellant was saying. The court noted it was unfortunate that the judge intervened in 
the manner that he did, and that he did not allow the prosecutor to perform his task. 
However, the conduct of the judge was not deemed to characterise an unfair trial.
83
 In 
Meall
84
 it was also held that the questioning by the judge did not fall into the trap of 
improper judicial discretion. On appeal the defence submitted that the judge should 
have discharged the jury after making a number inappropriate comments that 
intimated two witnesses must have made a mistake and the defendant did indeed kick 
the victim. In his summing up the judge directed the jury to only consider the 
evidence they have heard before them and not the questioning or comments made by 
himself. The Defendant was convicted by a majority of eleven to one. The Court of 
                                                        
77
 ibid per Laws LJ at para 12. 
78
 Ibid para 15. 
79
 [2008] EWCA Crim 2043. 
80
 ibid per Silber J at para 24. 
81
 [2011] EWCA Crim 271. 
82
 Ibid per Wilkie J at para 27. 
83
 Ibid at para 29. 
84
 [2011] EWCA Crim 2526. 
 11 
Appeal held that the judge waited to the appropriate point to question the Defendant 
and that the questions were limited in scope. The court was satisfied that the judge did 
not invite the jury to disbelieve the evidence and he offered a robust direction to the 
jury, thus the conviction was considered safe.  
 
Whilst case management has always made up a component part of the role of the 
judge, until the dawn of the new millennium he was often still viewed as the passive 
pilot. The advent of the CrimPR has allowed the judge has shed his coat of passivity 
in favour of a more interventionist role. A just and fair hearing should undoubtedly 
underpin a criminal process. However, the members of the judiciary that act in an 
interventionist manner potentially undermine the classic notion of adversarialism. 
Furthermore, the managerial aims of an expeditious and efficient criminal trial shake 
the adversarial foundation to its very core.  
 
4. The Death of the Adversarialism: The Pursuit of the 
Overriding Objective.  
 
Undoubtedly, the criminal trial has always evolved through time. The development of 
the adversarial criminal trial occurred whilst the court was still trying to preserve the 
‘accused speaks’ trial. By retaining this form of trial would allow the court would till 
benefit from treating the court as an ‘informational resource’ and have him openly 
talking at trial and control of the proceedings remained with the judiciary. Adversarial 
theory heralds that the trial is a dispute between two competing sides, which are in a 
position of equality. The argument takes place before a passive and neutral 
adjudicator. The evidence is predominately oral and it is the responsibility of the 
adjudicator to ensure the parties stay within the rules.
85
 Each side is responsible for 
the presentation of their individual case, the trial being the forum in which the guilt or 
innocence of the Defendant is resolved.
86
 Arguably, the trial in the new millennium 
has departed from this traditional stance of adversarialism; what has gone relatively 
unreported is the potential impact this change holds for justice. 
 
The accused speaks trial reflected the notion that the trial was designed to establish 
the truth of a particular accusation. William Hawkins in Treatise of the Pleas of the 
Crown illustrated the importance of using the accused as an informational resource to 
be investigated by the court. He said ‘[the] guilty, when they speak for themselves, 
may often help disclose the truth, which probably would not so well be discovered 
from the artificial defence of others speaking for them.’87 The Prisoners’ Counsel Act 
1836 provided full rights for defence counsel to address juries as well as examine and 
cross-examine witnesses and thus ending the judicial involvement in the presentation 
of evidence and examining witness. Langbein suggests that the truth became a by-
product of the criminal trial
88
 as each partisan party is concerned with winning rather 
than establishing the truth.
89
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Arguably, the implementation of the CPR alongside the judiciary assuming a more 
interventionist role might suggest that the pendulum is moving toward re-establishing 
the importance of the truth in criminal trials opposed to proof. This can be illustrated 
in the post-Auld review criminal trials. In Gleeson
90
 the court ruled that the defence 
tactic of an ambush defence will no longer be tolerated. At the close of the 
prosecution case, the defence submitted no case to answer. The court allowed the 
prosecution to amend the indictment. The defence objected; they anticipated their 
submission would be successful.  As such, counsel deliberately did not cross examine 
witnesses. The prosecution application was successful and the defendant was 
convicted. His appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, Auld LJ stated that a 
prosecution ‘should not be frustrated errors of the prosecutor … for defence advocates 
to take advantage of such errors by deliberately delaying identification of an issue of 
fact or law in the case until the last possible moment is, in our view no longer 
acceptable …’91 This is a clear example of the court emphasizing the discovery of the 
truth over proving the allegation; as in the first instance, the prosecution could not 
prove the offence was committed by the defendant. It could only be proven once the 
indictment had been amended. This is an erosion of the penalty shoot-out theory of 
criminal procedure. The Crown had one shot at goal, and if the striker missed, 
however unlucky, he did not get another chance.
92
 
 
The truth seeking nature of the trial is also exemplified by the case management 
provisions of the CrimPR; the power conferred on the judiciary and magistracy to 
ensure the provisions are followed. The case management form ensures that the ‘real 
issues’ have to be identified in advance of trial.93 This is nothing new to Crown Court 
proceedings as the Criminal Investigations and Procedure Act 1996
94
 compelled the 
accused to complete a defence case statement in advance of trial. However, for 
magistrates’ court cases this provision was merely voluntary.95 Rule 3.2 CPR 2013 
indicates that the court furthers the overriding objective by actively managing the 
case.
96
 Never before has the judiciary or magistracy had such explicit directions as to 
what constitutes their role of active case management. Some of the component parts 
present great danger to the notion of adversarialism in England and Wales. Arguably, 
the case management forms are akin to completing a defence case statement under the 
CPIA
97
; effectively the case management forms circumvent the voluntary nature of 
the statutory legislation. Whilst defence disclosure is not an entirely novel 
proposition, never before has the defendant had to disclose so much information.
98
 It 
might be argued that dual goals of active case management by the judiciary and 
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magistracy combined with the desire for expeditious and efficient trials have the 
effect of returning the trial to the ‘accused speaks’ format. However, the modern day 
‘accused speaks’ trial has a notable difference from its earlier counterpart; the accused 
is now speaking through written case management disclosures, as opposed to orally 
disclosing information. It has been claimed that defence disclosure does weaken a 
fundamental adversarial foundation, namely that the burden of proof rests solely on 
the prosecution. However, The Roskill committee reporting in 1987 suggested that 
this issue might be circumvented: 
 
‘The prosecution would still have to prepare their case fully … including 
making early disclosure of their evidence … we recognize that the burden of 
proof would be affected if the prosecution were allowed to alter the nature of 
their case once the defence had been disclosed. To avoid this possibility, any 
proposal would there have to involve the prosecution’s case being “fixed” 
before the defence could show his hand. If the prosecution sought to change 
their ground … or, if it were not too late, to ensure the that the prosecution 
adhered to the original case’.99  
 
The approach offered by the Roskill committee is admirable; it sets out that the 
burden of proof would be significantly diluted if the prosecution were permitted to 
amend their case once the defence has been disclosed. However, the ‘sea change’ 
which started with the Auld Review and permeated through the judiciary and 
magistracy to enact a change in culture almost ignores the due process safeguard 
highlighted by the committee. The modern judge will permit the prosecution to alter 
an indictment to ensure cases are not frustrated by prosecutorial error.
100
 Whilst this 
satisfies the goal of an efficient and expeditious criminal process the decision is one 
that is certainly non-adversarial. The court in Chabaan
101
was entirely correct, time is 
not unlimited but the duel goals of efficiency and case management should not be 
fulfilled by the potential prejudice to the defendant. The changing role has further 
distorted the role of the judge; it appears there is some difficulty in ascertaining the 
boundaries in which they operate. In Cordingley
102
 the judge was discourteous and 
rude and in Copsey
103
 the Court of Appeal deemed his interventions all too frequent. 
However, in more recent times the judge has been permitted to act as a second 
prosecutor.
104
 He asked many questions during the trial, rendering the boundaries of 
the role are rather opaque. What is clear is that the modern day judiciary and 
magistracy are no longer passive umpires, but active case managers who pilot the case 
along the correct flight path to ensure nobody veers off course.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The evolution of the interventionist judge comes at a time where the nature of the 
criminal trial is shifting from its traditional adversarial roots. This shift is occurring 
with a dilution of due process ideals and is being replaced with a managerial approach 
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that is underpinned by a crime control agenda. The implementation of these ideas sits 
rather awkwardly in the adversarial process.  The managerial model dislikes party 
control and this control is now taken away from the State and defence lawyers and 
transferred to the court.
105
 The judiciary in the twenty-first century plays a far more 
prominent role than his twentieth century predecessor. The judge is no longer 
described as passive and is the undoubted key figure throughout the trial process. He 
is more than a pilot, more than an umpire. He is the manager, with the goal of 
concluding the trial is the most expedited manner possible. Should either side not 
comply with the directions given by the ‘manager’, they may face a number of 
sanctions. The Court can fix, postpone, bring forward, cancel or adjourn a hearing. It 
can make a costs order and finally, it can impose any other sanction as may be 
appropriate.
106
 In reality, the judiciary can issue any sanction they deem suitable.
107
  
 
The interventionist judge has his goals underpinned by the CPR. The traditional 
adversarial trial has diminished in importance and it is no longer the forum in which 
the prosecution and defence zealously represent their clients. With the death of the 
ambush defence, the creation of both the defence case statement under the s.5 CPIA 
1996 and the analogous requirement under the CPR 2013 the adversarial battle has 
been replaced with each party knowing the ‘real issues’ of the opposition’s case. This 
is in stark contrast to the development of disclosure regime. Historically, disclosure 
was the antidote to the potential unfairness caused by the inequality of resources 
between the prosecution and defence.
108
 In the modern criminal trial a notion of co-
operation permeates through the trial process; illustrated by the creation of timetables 
and each side informing the judiciary of any significant failures by themselves or their 
opponent. The sea change is clear and the evolving role of the judiciary should be 
viewed through the same lens. It is judiciary who allows the sea change by 
performing the pivotal role of case manager. The very idea that trials should become 
more efficient and resources should be saved is admirable and one that should be 
embraced. The need for heavy-handed judiciary appears sensible considering each 
side should be adversaries. The overriding objective is to deal with cases justly
109
 and 
the judiciary has a number of tools available to ensure that goal is met. However, in 
meeting this goal, the judiciary has to act in a manner that is distinctly non-
adversarial. Having non-adversarial traits in a due process adversarial system appears 
to sit rather awkwardly, the meeting of the overriding objective by active case 
management with an interventionist judiciary is distinctly non-adversarial. Professor 
McEwan suggests that a new ethical code is needed if the criminal justice system is 
no longer adversarial.
110
 There has been no explicit statement to suggest that 
adversarialism is abandoned. Although perhaps this has been suggested implicitly; 
piecemeal changes to the criminal justice process and increasing significance of 
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judicial intervention since the turn of the century suggest a new form of process is 
being created. A cornerstone of this change is the return to the ‘accused speaks’ trial. 
The importance of having the accused speak was best highlighted by the earlier 
Hawkins quote for ‘[the] guilty, when they speak for themselves, may often help 
disclose the truth, which probably would not so well be discovered from the artificial 
defence of others speaking for them.’ 111  The interventionist judiciary and the 
disclosure regime are forcing the accused to talk by having them ‘identify the real 
issues’ at an early stage. The culture does not represent a shift in process toward 
inquisitorialism. Instead the shift is toward managerialism and at the heart of this shift 
is the interventionist judiciary who is not merely a pilot, the pendulum has swung and 
the former pilot has been promoted to a General.  
 
Total Word Count (excluding footnotes): 6,704 
 
Total Word Count (including footnotes): 8,016 
 
 
 
Keywords: Criminal Procedure Rules, Adversarialism, Managerialism, Judiciary  
                                                        
111
 W. Hawkins, A Treatise of the Please of the Crown, Vol II, (London 1721) cited in n.1 at p.171. 
